Robert A. Stebbins — Leisure Reflections / No. 69

“What is leisure and what is not leisure: Some pesky neighboring conceptions”

Reprinted from the International Journal of Philosophy of Work and Idleness, first issue in 2026

Work and Leisure: A Conceptual Exploration

The conception of work used here was initially presented in Stebbins (2009, p. 21). There he cited Herbert Applebaum (1992, p. x) who holds that work has no satisfactory definition, since the idea relates to all human activities. That caveat aside, he sees it, among other ways, as performance of useful activity (making things, performing services) done as all or part of sustaining life, as a livelihood. Some people are remunerated for their work, whereas others get paid in kind or directly keep body and soul together with the fruits of their labor (e.g., subsistence farming, hunting, fishing). Work, thus described, is as old as humankind, since all apart from a few privileged people have always had to seek a livelihood. The same may be said for leisure, to the extent that some free time has always existed in the sense that work is done, though there may be non-work obligations of an unpleasant (non-leisure) nature.

The definition of leisure presented below is intended to bridge the individual and contextual approaches evident in social science theory, with both being important in defining leisure. From these two angles, leisure is seen and experienced through activities by the individual participant and seen as implanted in a wider social, cultural, historical, and geographical world. Leisure is thus uncoerced, contextually framed activity engaged in during free time perceived as such, which people want to do and, using their abilities and resources, actually do in either a satisfying or a fulfilling way (or both) (Stebbins, 2020). Free time is time away from unpleasant, or disagreeable, obligations, with pleasant obligation being treated of here as essentially leisure (Stebbins, 2000). In other words, homo otiosus feels no significant coercion to enact the activity in question. Some kinds of work—described as “devotee work”—can be understood as pleasant obligation, for these workers, even though they must make a living by performing that work, accomplish this in a pursuit having strong intrinsic appeal, a passion (Stebbins, 2022). Work of this kind, it is argued here, is essentially serious leisure. This definition stresses human agency, or “intentionality” (Rojek, 2010, p. 6)—what “people want to do”—and distinguishes the more superficial satisfaction gained from casual leisure vis-à-vis the deep self-fulfillment flowing from serious participation.

Note that reference to “free choice” (a long-standing component of standard definitions of leisure), for reasons discussed more fully elsewhere (Stebbins, 2005), is deliberately omitted from this definition. Generally put, choice is never wholly free, but rather hedged about with all sorts of contextual conditions. In a nutshell, the position taken here following Juniu and Henderson (2001), is that freedom and state of mind cannot be understood as essential elements in a basic definition of leisure and neighboring concepts.

We shall see that the failure to develop a definition as detailed as the one just presented has hampered the growth of the sociology of leisure. In its place the usual definition is basically common sense; in other words, leisure is seen by this branch of sociology as not work (Cheek, 1971; Stebbins, 2018). Such a definition tells us nothing about the essential qualities of leisure, thus giving scant guidance on how to study uncoerced activity in theory, research, or practice.

Is this contemporary definition of leisure what Aristotle called eudemonia in his Nicomachean Ethics? While often translated as “happiness,” eudaimonia encompasses more than just feeling good. Nevertheless, it also involves flourishing, success, and living a life of fulfillment. Self-fulfillment, furthermore, is often regarded as a synonym for the pursuit of serious leisure. In that same book he also addresses himself to hedonism. Hedonism is the good that is pleasure and its pursuit. Still, Aristotle also wrote that the good is excellence and its pursuit, and if you do it right you will also get happiness and pleasure.

 Neighboring Concepts

Studying the concepts that are what we might call neighbors to the central concept is a fruitful approach to further understanding that central concept. Knowing what it is not helps sharpen our understanding of that concept. Several of these neighbors to the concept of leisure are the focus of the rest of this article.

Idleness is one such Neighbor.

However, when used to describe a person, idle typically carries a negative connotation, with the assumption that the person is wasting their time by doing nothing of value. Such a view is reflected in the proverb “an idle mind is the devil’s workshop.” Also, the popular phrase “killing time” refers to idleness and can be defined as spending time doing nothing in particular in order that time seems to pass more quickly. (Wikipedia, retrieved 2 May 2025)

That said, various scholars have also written about the benefits of idleness. Brian O’Connor, for example, argues that the case against an indifference to work and effort is flawed, that idle aimlessness may instead allow for the highest form of freedom. Bertrand Russell’s publisher wrote the following about his book:

The collection includes essays on the subjects of sociology, ethics, and philosophy. In the eponymous essay, Russell displays a series of arguments and reasoning with the aim of stating how the ‘belief in the virtue of labour causes great evils in the modern world, and that the road to happiness and prosperity lies instead in a diminution of labour’ and how work ‘is by no means one of the purposes of human life’. (taken from, Wikipedia, Idleness, retrieved 4 May 2025)

Play is another Neighboring concept. Huizinga’s (1955) treatise is a basic point of reference in this area. He argued that play is disinterested or lamely interested activity. Still, the goal of any definition is to set out its essential features, thereby distinguishing the definiendum from everything else. Roger Caillois (1961) labels Huizinger’s position as Concentration 1 and then introduces Concentrations 2 and 3. The latter two fall at the end of a continuum set out by Roger Caillois (1961) as ludus, or rule-governed activity. At the other end of his continuum lies paidia, the play of Concentration 1. Since such efforts are uncommon when it comes to defining play, the definition of Edward Norbeck is especially welcome.

His is a provisional definition, provisional in that future thought and research could prompt changes to it. He holds that play is ‘behavior resting upon a biologically inherited stimulus or proclivity, that is distinguished by a combination of traits: play is voluntary, somehow pleasurable, distinct temporally from other behavior, and distinct in having a make-believe or transcendental quality’ (Norbeck, 1974, p. 1). He goes on to note that many definitions of play include the condition that it is non-utilitarian. Observing that this may not always apply to professionals in art and sport, he prefers to say that ‘at least among non-professional players, the goals of play are usually not consciously utilitarian’(p. 2). He states further that there is in play “a transcendence of ordinary cognitive states which . . . seems to represent altered neurophysiology in a distinct and distinctive physiological state.” Kimberlee Bonura (2009) adds that play is self-initiated, self-ended and open-ended, thereby falling at the opposite end of a continuum starting with the domain of work. Furthermore, play activities have a beginning and an end.

That play is defined as a kind of behavior is not to imply that the latter is necessarily physical. True, we can physically play or dabble with an object or an organism, including objects and organisms that some other people approach seriously (e.g., a piano, microscope, or food on a plate). Yet, it appears that play can also be mental behavior, as seen most vividly in the creative, innovative manipulation, both conscious and semi-conscious, of certain ideational elements leading thereby to new constructs of immense variety. These ideas may be expressed in, for instance, daydreams, stories, pretend play, and solutions to problems (including serious ones). Artistic and scientific creativity as well as strategies for winning games and sporting competitions also exemplify this kind of play. Consonant with this mental behavior thesis is one of the OED’s many definitions of play: “3 fig. & gen. Action, activity, operation, working, esp. with rapid movement or change, or variety. (Now almost always of abstract things, as fancy, thought, etc.)” Thus it should come as no surprise that the study of play revolves substantially around its psychological and neurological roots in humans as well as, recently, those found in other mammals in whom play behavior has also been observed (these last two paragraphs have been taken from Stebbins, 2015).

Relaxation, unlike idleness, is doing something, since relaxation is a casual leisure activity. It includes watching passersby from a table inside or outside a café, dozing in a hammock, sunbathing at a beach or at home on the patio, listening to music, taking in a scenic view of nature, and the like. Strolling through a magnificent garden, such as Keukenhof Garden in the Netherlands, the diverse Royal Parks in London, and the Butchart Gardens in Victoria, British Columbia, Canada, can make for a relaxing experience. Going on a picnic in a park, campground, or beach is meant to be relaxing, among other attractive features (e.g., fresh air, scenery, birdcalls). Meandering along a reasonably flat hiking trail can be a relaxing experience, especially when it borders water such as a creek or lake.  The same is true for some types of meditation, which is defined by the Cambridge Dictionary as “the act of giving your attention to only one thing, either as a religious activity or as a way of becoming calm and relaxed.”

Sensory stimulation can sometimes be considered a neighboring concept. It comes in diverse forms, including meditation, sex, eating, and drinking alcoholic beverages. One can also find such stimulation in viewing beautiful scenery, hearing the rendition of a certain piece of music, or viewing the presentation of a certain piece of art or sculpture. Alcoholic consumption, after a certain point, does inhibit some communication. Yet, other communication, like insults, challenges, and sexual innuendo, may occur when a drinker is under such influence.

Loafing is still another neighboring concept. The OED defines it as to “spend time idly, loiter; saunter.” It is quintessential hedonic casual leisure that appears to be immensely popular, though I know of no quantitative measure of the nature or extent of free-time loafing in any particular population. Nevertheless, the practice merits our attention, for it is part of common-sense and often finds its way into everyday talk. Moreover, as casual leisure it qualifies as relaxation and sometimes also as play or sensory stimulation, if not both. In short, we should not in studying leisure ignore loafing when presenting an inclusive portrait of the leisure domain (as is attempted in textbooks, encyclopedias, and survey courses).

Loafing can be described as residual fun activity: what some people do when free of the negative obligations of work and non-work (Stebbins, 2017). This residual image denotes a passive approach to free time, as expressed in “I’ll just vegetate” (until I must return to work, until I must go grocery shopping, etc.). And what does such vegetation consist of? Examples include a casual, even haphazard, searching for something interesting to do as realized through television channel surfing or flipping through the pages of a magazine. One might also vegetate by loafing; by dozing, sitting outside and watching passersby, browsing on a smart phone, or lounging in the warmth of the sun or a blazing fire in the hearth at home. All can be classified as casual leisure, as passive activity of one sort or another. This is where in common-sense the general public observes play as disinterested or lamely interested activity (Huizinga, 1955).

A related idea is that leisure is spontaneous fun, in the sense that there is little need or desire to plan for it in advance, that what we do in free time can be, perhaps should be, determined on the spot (Stebbins, 2017). Such leisure seems often to be born of a full schedule of work and non-work obligation such that little or no time is ordinarily available to plan free-time interests beforehand. A typical scenario might be the person unexpectedly faced with a full day clear of disagreeable obligations and the question of what to do during this time. What to do: watch some television, visit a friend, work on a puzzle, walk in a local park, play solitaire, stroll through a trendy shopping area, or do a combination of these? Much if not all of this is fun, differing from the planned-fun type primarily by its spontaneous entry into the participant’s awareness. Still, conscious decisions are made on the spot about what to do to optimally use the newly found free time. Residual leisure, on the other hand, consists of drifting from one superficial interest to another in attempting to pass time.

The risk with all residual leisure is that it can descend into the neighboring state of boredom, given that the first seems typically to be only a half-hearted attempt to avoid the second. Residual leisure is probably most of the time short-term, but its duration does depend on, among other conditions, the availability of resources. One set of resources is made up of parks, plazas, bazaars (souks), shopping malls, pedestrian streets and ways, and the like. In such places one may loaf by sitting and watching passersby. Another is handy visual and light reading material in the form of popular magazines and newspapers, and for children, picture books (all being the fare of waiting rooms, which are notorious for their tendency to generate boredom). Entertainment television serves as another resource in this category, providing however, that the programming is only marginally entertaining for the loafing viewer.

Day dreaming can be a loafer’s resource. It is positive not nightmarish, and as such, can provide the dreamer with imagined fancies of love, fame, fortune, excitement, holidays, consumer goods, and the list goes on. Loafing can also occur as sauntering, as casually walking and observing on a street (including casual window shopping), in a garden, along a walking path, and so on. Another resource supports loafing as loitering, as effected in hanging around (often with others) on a street corner, in a bar or coffee shop.

From what has been said so far, loafing is not boredom. Yet, there is a risk that it might become so, since loafing is not powerfully attractive. Indeed, it is in one sense mildly negative; that is, as noted earlier, it is a stopgap, a way of pleasantly passing time between activities of greater attractiveness — leisure (other casual or serious) or greater duty — work or non-work obligation. In other words, loafing has the potential for becoming boring. Barbalet (1999) observed that boredom springs from a person’s perception of the meaninglessness of a situation or activity. Boredom, Barbelet says, “is a restless, irritable feeling that the subject’s current activity or situation holds no appeal and that there is a need to get on with something interesting” (p. 631). It is an emotional state of mind rooted in an acute lack of significance for the bored individual of objects, activities, or the situation itself, as understood within that person’s values and the larger culture.

Clearly, boredom does not spring exclusively from inactivity (“nothing to do”); it can also arise from activity which, alas, is uninteresting, unstimulating, as can happen with loafing. Furthermore, since boredom is a decidedly negative state of mind, it must be concluded that, logically, it is not leisure at all (Stebbins, 2009, p. 9). For leisure is typically conceived of as a positive mindset; according to our definition of leisure, it is something people want to do. Nonetheless, a session of loafing might not last long enough to degenerate into boredom, or the supply of resources is sufficient enough to prevent such change.

Conclusions

The key concepts here are work and leisure, and the neighboring concepts of play, idleness, boredom, fun, loafing, sensory stimulation, and relaxation. All these concepts refer to activities or, in the cases of idleness and boredom, non-activities. Moreover, these activities are pursued in everyday life, and nearly everyone has experienced some of them. Nevertheless, boredom is decidedly negative and in itself inclines its victims to find ways of alleviating it. These ways may be positive, as in doing some casual leisure, like going to a café to watch passersby or to a nearby bookshop to buy an entertaining magazine. On the negative side one might try out an hallucinogenic drug, go to Ukraine to help their cause, or simply move to another city where there is much more to do.

This said, the exploration of the neighboring concepts of work and leisure provides an enlightened context to the understanding of those two central ideas. In other words, we have sharpened our understanding of the two by pointing out what they are not. This is a fruitful philosophic approach to any definition, and is thereby well within the scope of the new periodical International Journal of Philosophy of Work and Idleness. May there be more of the same in future issues.

References

Applebaum, Herbert. (1992). The concept of work: Ancient, medieval, and modern. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press.

Barbalet, J. M. (1999). Boredom and social meaning. British Journal of Sociology, 50(4), 631-646.

Caillois, Roger. (1961). Man, play and games, trans. Meyer Barash, Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press.

Cheek Jr., Neil H. (1971). Toward a sociology of not-work. Sociological Perspectives, 14(3), 245–258.

Huizinga, Johan. Homo ludens: A study of the play element in culture, Boston: Beacon, 1955

Juniu, Susana, & Henderson, Karla (2001). Problems in researching leisure and women: Global considerations. World Leisure Journal, 43(4), 3–10.

Bonura, Kimberlee (2009). Academic learning and play. In Rodney P. Carlisle (Ed.), Encyclopedia of play in today’s society (pp. 1-5). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Norbeck, Edward. “The anthropological study of human play.” Rice University Studies 60, no. 3 (1974): 1-8.

O’Conner, Brian, Idleness: A Philosophical Essay. Princeton University Press, 2018.

Rojek, Chris (2010). The labour of leisure. Sage.

Russel, Bertrand, In Praise of Idleness and Other Essays. George Allen & Unwin, 1935.

Stebbins, Robert A. (2000). Obligation as an aspect of leisure experience. Journal of Leisure Research, 32, 152–155.

Stebbins, Robert A. (2005). Choice and experiential definitions of leisure. Leisure Sciences, 27, 349–352.

Stebbins, Robert A. (2009). Personal decisions in the public square:

Beyond problem solving into a positive sociology. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction.

Stebbins, Robert A. (2017). Leisure’s legacy: Challenging the common-sense view of free time. Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan.

Stebbins, Robert A. (2018). The sociology of leisure: An estranged child of mainstream sociology. International Journal of the Sociology of Leisure, 1(1), 43–53.

Stebbins, Robert A. (2020). The serious leisure perspective: A synthesis. Palgrave Macmillan.

Stebbins, Robert A. (2022). Occupational devotion: Finding fun and fulfilment at work. London: Anthem Press.

March 2026 – Leisure Reflections Research Blog) No. 70, March 2026

“ Paying volunteers: A controversial and complex proposition ”